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ABSTRACT
Finding revenue is a challenge that faces many municipalities in the
United States. As the tax base continues to decline and demand for government
services increases, local governments are forced to make hard choices. Low on
the list of priorities for local governments is the maintenance, and construction of
infrastructure. Traditionally there have been several ways for local governments
to fund long-term infrastructure projects including, federal-aid through the
process of earmarking. The practice of earmarking has been around since the
first congress, but hit its peak between 2003 and 2007. The earmarking process
is controversial for several reasons; earmarking bypasses traditional merit
procedures for distribution of federal-aid, earmarking is said to add costs to the
agency awarded the funding, and earmarking has been linked to Congressional
scandals and wasteful spending. In this paper I explore how an earmark,
designated to local governments to fund long-term infrastructure projects,
contributes to the costs of the project.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Governmental financial management is a complicated process of
balancing limited resources and copious amounts of need. In recent years,
governments at all levels have experienced a collapsing tax base that has
significantly decreased their revenue stream. As a result, state and local
governments are allocating a smaller amount of funding to an increased number
of programs, in order to keep up with the increased demand for everything from
everyday general services to long-term capital projects (Kunz, 2008). Low on the
list of priority spending is long-term capital projects, most notably the
development and maintenance of infrastructure.
The slow decay of American infrastructure is an issue of public safety.
Regular maintenance of bridges, roadways and water systems prevents delays in
interstate commerce, extensive vehicle repair costs, unsafe travel, and a
poisonous water supply (Dannin, 2011). The recent lead poisoning disaster in
Flint, Michigan illustrates the public health concerns weak infrastructure and
regulation can create. Incidents of mass flooding resulting from weak levies in
New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, the disintegration of the I-35 bridge in
Minnesota, and the explosion of underground pipes in New York, San Diego, and
Los Angeles further demonstrate the need to rejuvenate public works systems
(Rubin, 2012). According to Bell et al. (2005), the National League of Cities
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“stressed the efficacy of an infrastructure system should be measured not only by
the investment in the physical structure but also by the service the investment
provides” (p. 11). Thus, infrastructure building and maintenance should be
considered a means of job creation and economic development within a
community. However, there is a tendency to ignore infrastructure projects until a
disaster occurs. Fiscal stress, stagnant revenues, and the decrease in
intergovernmental revenue sharing have made it more difficult to fund capital
improvement programs, that aide in the repair of broken infrastructure (Kunz &
O’Leary, 2012). The consequence is an infrastructure plan that is limited and
often unproductive, because government agencies are in need of funding
sources to address this growing concern.
Building and maintaining bridges and roads generate high costs and lack
in political reward, thus government spending has focused on education,
healthcare, and social programs, which are higher on the list of constituent
concerns (Kunz, 2008). With a large number of state and local governments
faced with fiscal challenges, one of the few options for funding infrastructure
programs is reliance on federal government assistance. Federal funding has
become a safety net to finance infrastructure projects, but the availability and
eligibility of federal grant programs is often timely and difficult (DeFigueiredo &
Silverman, 2007). As an alternative, state and local officials have reached out to
federal legislators for alternative funding methods (Kunz, 2008). One such form is
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the use of earmarked funds, a controversial budgeting practice that has been
highly scrutinized in the last ten years.
The practicality of earmarking funds for local infrastructure projects is
debatable, because it is argued that earmarks actually cost the states, agencies,
and organizations in added execution costs. Often, the functions of earmarks are
funded from within the original budget, decreasing the “top line” not adding
additional funding (Savage, 2009). For example, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008
Congress deducted $3.5 billion from multiple accounts in the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) budget, in order to account for 2108 earmarks Congress added
during the appropriations process (Savage, 2009). Other studies have shown
that earmark funds have become a revenue replacement for particular projects,
and traditional revenue sources are shifted to other areas. Borg and Mason
(1990) found that increased revenue from lottery sales that are earmarked for
school aid, resulted in a decrease in traditional federal and state aid allocated to
schools. Further, without earmarks agencies are often forced to increase
spending on lobbying efforts and other tactics to secure extra funding for budget
deficient programs (Nixon, 2014). Thus, a key question is whether earmarked
funds designated for infrastructure, and other capital projects cost state and local
governments more in added costs, or does the absence of earmarking create an
additional financial burden on state and local governments? The literature is
relatively silent on this subject, and there is a need for a broader look at how
earmarking affects state and local government budgeting. The core question this
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research aims to address is: To what extent does earmarking funds for
infrastructure projects inflate the overall cost of the project? Further, this research
explores related questions: First, how does earmarking funds diminish the
viability and overall outcome of infrastructure projects. Second, how are
earmarked funds handed down from congress more, or less, effective than
traditional funding tools, such as grants and designated tax funds?
The purpose of this study is to explore the extent of state and local
government’s reliance on earmarks to fund infrastructure projects. Specifically,
whether the absence of earmarked funds affect the ability of state and local
governments to fund infrastructure projects, or whether the added execution
costs of earmarking funds make budgeting without earmarking more effective.
The study will use raw data to analyze projects designated for earmarks and the
effects of the projects final outcome on the agency it was designated.
In order to answer the research question, to what extent does earmarking
funds for infrastructure projects inflate the overall cost of the project, I will first,
introduce the process of earmarking, and review the advantages and
disadvantages of the process. Next, I will describe infrastructure financing
options for local governments. I then present a methodology to illustrate with a
case study of the Coachella Valley in California, specifically how earmarks used
for infrastructure projects effect project costs in local governments. I conclude
that earmarks are only a supplemental not a direct cause of the inflation of the
overall project costs, earmark funding is not more or less effective as a funding
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source than traditional funding tools, and earmarks as a funding source are
similar to grants in functionality, but lack the oversight and competitive nature.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PROCESS OF EARMARKS

Earmarking from the Beginning
The legislative practice of securing funds for specific projects to increase
support for other legislative actions has been a government practice as far back
as the first Congress. The authoring of the Lighthouses Act of 1789, which made
state-owned lighthouses federally monitored, gained votes through “pork-belly”
politics. In exchange for votes, members of Congress authored funding
(earmarks) into the bill for a new lighthouse in Virginia, and new piers on the
Atlantic coast, at the request of members of Congress that needed to satisfy
constituents (Kelly, 2012). Over two hundred years later trading votes for
earmarks became common practice.
From 1990 to 2006 it appeared legislation saw a steady increase in the
practice of earmarking. As a comparison, consider in1996 the federal defensespending bill contained 270 earmarked projects, but the 2006 version of the bill
contained over 2800 earmarked projects (Savage, 2009). According to Porter
and Walsh (2006), the total number of earmarks increased by over 71 percent
(4,126 in 1994 to 13,997 in 2005). Conversely during the same time period, the
total dollar allocated for earmarked projects decreased from $5.92 billion to $1.95
billion (Porter & Walsh, 2006). This represents a 67 percent decrease from 1994
to 2005. The decrease was the result, in part, of smaller projects receiving
6

earmarked funding, such as Labor and Transportation, compared to extensive
bridge and road projects in prior years (Porter & Walsh, 2008). Overall from
1990-2006 more than 100,000 earmarks worth over $290 billion were tacked
onto spending legislation (Crespin et al., 2009).
In 2006, former California Congressman, Randy Cunningham, was
convicted, and sentenced to eight years in prison for taking over $2 million in
bribes from military contractors in return for earmarks that would clear the path
for government contracts (Kunz & O’Leary, 2012). Cunningham’s conviction put a
spotlight on the earmarking process and quickly created claims of government
corruption (Lazarus, 2010). Media and watchdog groups began to expose the
opportunistic practices within Congress, leading to public outcry and reforms
(Savage, 2009). In 2007, the total number of earmarks dipped due in part to a
self-imposed moratorium Congress established, because earmarking became
“out of hand and was used and abused in a fashion we have not seen before in
recent years” (Doyle, 2011).
The moratorium period lasted less than a year while Congress debated
reforms for the earmarking process. In 2008, despite a crippling recession the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act contained over $17 billion in earmarks,
and in 2009 another $7.7 billion was included in the Omnibus Spending Bill
(Crespin et al., 2009). In 2011, with media attention focused solely on the
negative aspects of earmarking Congress put a hiatus on the practice, because
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earmarks had “become a symbol of a Congress that has broken faith with the
people” (Seymour, 2012).
In 2012, public interest group Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS),
reported that earmarks were not on hiatus just less transparent and renamed
(Nixon, 2012). TCS claimed Congress created numerous “slush funds” in budget
documents, reduced funding for projects in the President’s budget, and moved
the money into the various funds to pay for particular projects, “earmarking”
(Nixon, 2012). According to Citizens against Government Waste (CAGW), the
2014 budget included $2.7 billion in individual legislator requested projects
(Zelizer, 2014). It would appear that legislators have just found new terms for
earmarking, such as letter-marking to secure funds on a smaller scale (Zelizer,
2014).
The practice of letter-marking is a less transparent process then
earmarking. According to Mills et al., (2015) “letter-marking is a common practice
among members of Congress that spans several agencies for a wide range of
projects” (p. 7). Letter-marking begins with a constituent request for funding.
Requests come in two ways; programmatic requests, which allow Congress to
designate funding for an entire program, but not the specific projects completed
within the program, and language requests, which persuades an agency to fund
a program, but does not definitively direct funding (Mills et al., 2015). Once
Congress has made the programmatic or language request it is inserted into the
language of a spending bill (Mills et al., 2015). Then the requesting Member of
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Congress will write letters to heads of agencies “encouraging” them to fund
particular programs and projects in their districts (Mills et al., 2015). It is unknown
to what extent the practice effects agency decision making, but there is some
evidence to suggest it is not as successful as earmarking.
After the sixteen-day government shutdown in October 2013 claims that
the earmark hiatus was a smoke screen, and letter-marking replaced the practice
with the same result was debatable. Political science professor Scott Frisch
believed, “without the grease or lubricant of earmarks, it’s much more difficult to
reach a compromise on some of these tough issues” (Kelly, 2012, p. 1).
Members of Congress, Republican and Democrat, have come to rely on
earmarks as a financial tool for funneling funding into their districts for large
projects such as, bridges, roads, and universities. Absent earmarks state and
local governments must find other revenue sources to fund these projects. With
so much of state and local funding designated to fund operating expenses, the
loss of earmark funding could be detrimental to the capital budgeting process.

Operationalizing Earmarks
The term earmark has several different definitions, commonly earmarks
refer to legislative provisions that direct approved expenditures to specific states,
cities, and districts, to be designated for specific projects (Lazarus, 2009).
According to Lazarus (2009), earmarks are placed in specific appropriation bills
at the request of members of Congress in order to fund specific projects in their
districts. Requests are added to a spending bill after appropriations committees
9

have approved the text of the legislation, thus never actually voting on the
earmark (Poos, 2011). The earmark process makes the concept difficult to
define. Porter and Walsh (2006) explain “according to Congressional Quarterly’s
American Congressional Dictionary, because all appropriations set aside funds
for some ‘purpose, use, or recipient,’ under the broadest definition virtually every
appropriation is earmarked” (p. 3).
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2007) defines earmarks
as the following:
Funds provided by the congress for projects, programs, or grants
where the purported congressional direction (whether in statutory
text, report language, or other communication) circumvents
otherwise applicable merit-based or competitive allocation
processes, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise
curtails the ability of the executive branch to manage its statutory
and constitutional responsibilities to the funds allocation process
(OMB.gov).
The OMB definition brings into question the ability of the executive to have
discretion over legislative actions (Cuellar, 2012). Kunz and O’Leary (2012)
found:
Definitions within the branches of government differ considerably…
the most explicit of which is the executive branch’s perception of
earmarks as an impediment to its ability to manage statutory
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requirements. Senate rules equate earmarks with directed
spending and a focus on spending that wasn’t originally provided
for in legislation or committee reports, whereas the House defines
congressional earmark’ as spending authority requested by
specified individuals that has circumvented the formula-driven,
competitive award process (pp. 585-586).
Interest groups established for the purpose of “watching” government
spending habits such as Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS), and Citizens
against Government Waste (CAGW), have come to similar conclusions for the
definition of an earmark. TCS defines earmarks as, “legislative provisions that set
aside funds within an account for a specific program, project, activity, institution,
or location. These measures normally circumvent merit-based or competitive
allocation processes and appear in spending authorization, tax and tariff bills”
(Taxpayers.net, 2015). CAGW has a more detailed and perhaps more extreme
sense of the definition. CAGW refers to earmarks as pork barrel spending, and
defines them as a “line item in an appropriations bill that designates tax dollars
for a specific purpose in circumvention of established budgetary procedures”
(cagw.org, 2016). According to the CAGW Pig-Book (2016) a project must meet
one of seven criteria to be considered “pork,” those criteria are as follows:
1) requested by only one chamber of Congress, 2) Not specifically
authorized, 3) not competitively awarded, 4) not requested by the
President, 5) greatly exceeds the President’s budget request or the
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previous year’s funding, 6) not the subject of congressional
hearings, or 6) serves only a local or special interest (cagw.org).
It has been acknowledged that there exists a variety of definitions that
have historically been linked to earmarks in and out of government. Doyle (2011)
pointed out that “the term congressional directed spending item appeared as a
substitute for earmark” in 2007 and has since been used in spending bills (p. 70).
Further, Doyle (2011) explains that the variations of the earmark definitions
throughout the literature points to the complexity of the practice in the public
budgeting process, and clouds the accuracy of measuring earmark outcomes.
According to Porter and Walsh (2006) the definition of earmarks can be
generalized into four factors:
1) the specificity of the recipient; a provision that gives specific
direction of who is supposed to receive the funds and for what
project, 2) the congressional origin; projects requested from
members of Congress or added on to the President’s budget, 3)
exemption from the normal competitive requirements of budgeting
process; a lot of earmarking projects would normally call for a
bidding war among contracts, however the earmark process
bypasses this process and awards specific contracts, and 4)
presence of statutory text; the instructions for directing the funding
of earmarked projects are most commonly found in appropriations
committee reports (pp. 4-7).
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As is the case with most research in the social sciences determining the
“real” definition of a term can be a complex exercise. It is suggested that
concepts instead be broken down into either a nominal or operational definition
(Babbie, 2011). The operational definition specifies the exact way a concept will
be measured for a particular study (Babbie, 2011). For the purposes of this study
the definitions of earmark and infrastructure have been operationalized, and are
defined as specific funding designated for a particular project.

Advantages of Earmarks
In an environment of decreased revenue flow earmarks can assist state
and local governments in continued growth, and provide options beyond own
source revenues to fund infrastructure, without halting other areas of economic
development (Kunz & O’Leary, 2012). Earmarks have taken on a negative
connotation due in part to murmurs of government corruption. Despite the arrest
of Congressman Cunningham and the funding of Alaska’s infamous bridge to
nowhere, earmarks fund needed projects that would be deeply down sized or
otherwise not exist (Kunz & O’Leary, 2012). Earmark funding has assisted in
financing social programs such as, breast cancer research, and the Boys & Girls
Clubs of America (Weisman, 2008), and has several other positive uses
including; infrastructure, service vehicle purchases, and building improvements
(Kunz, 2008). In 2006, the majority of the $29 billion in earmarks were distributed
to state and local governments to repair roads, sewers, bridges, and other
infrastructural needs (Kunz, 2008). According to Kunz & O’Leary (2012),
13

earmarks bring in funding otherwise not available to state and local governments,
such as the funding for railway overpasses in Riverside, California, to relieve high
traffic areas and create a safer traffic flow. Earmarks protect federal aid to local
government projects from being eliminated when there is a change to the political
climate (Barret & Greene, 2013). Writing earmarks into spending bills reduces
federal agency discretion, and prevents funds designated to local governments
from being reassigned (Weisman, 2008).
Earmark proponents argue that government agencies, such as the
Department of Transportation (DOT), do not understand the needs of local
governments as well as their congressional representatives (Kunz & O’Leary,
2012). Clemmitt (2006) stated, “federal agencies would shortchange many
significant projects if lawmakers didn’t direct funds to them” (p. 535). In 1998, a
review of the DOTs funding for Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) projects
found that sixty-percent of the projects were not ranked as high-priority based the
department’s own merit-based evaluation system (Friel, 2004). Friel (2004) found
“several former Transportation Department officials admitted that politics
sometimes played a role in such decisions,” but projects “were selected mostly
on merit” (p. 4).
State and local governments are expected to go through a rigorous
process to prioritize and identify projects to receive traditional federal funding and
the benefit of earmark funding (Porter & Walsh, 2006). In 2004, $10 million for
improvements to Interstate 95 and a bridge connecting to beach towns in
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Delaware was awarded through the traditional merit funding procedures, and
supplemented with earmark funding (Friel, 2004). Friel (2004) explains, efforts to
“launch an offensive against earmarks,” fell short after it was discovered that
earmarked projects in DOT appropriations would have qualified for merit-based
federal funding (p. 3). Opponents often point to community improvement projects
such as bike paths, nature trails and sidewalks as wasteful spending funded with
earmarks, but DOT program formulas allow for such projects to receive federal
funding (Friel, 2004). Further, earmark projects require expenditure justification
forms for DOT oversight purposes (Friel, 2004).
Earmark opponents also argue that earmarks increase government
spending. Doyle (2011) explains, the budgetary literature has consistently shown
no link between the rise in earmark spending and the rise in government
spending. Further, after earmark reform policies were implemented in 2009,
earmark spending dropped just over fifty percent, but overall federal spending
increased forty-nine percent (Doyle, 2011). Porter & Walsh (2006) found that
8,000 earmarks totaling $10 billion made up only 1.2 percent of the $822 billion
transportation bill in FY 2004, prior to extensive earmark reforms. According to
Kunz and O’Leary (2012), earmarks are simply appropriated funds not additional
funding. The process simply directs the spending to a particular project, it does
not add to the total budget (Kunz & O’Leary, 2012). Eliminating earmarks would
not result in a budget savings, but would move spending to other projects,
handicapping revenue strapped state and local governments (Kunz & O’Leary,
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2012). Porter and Walsh, argue that all appropriations are technically earmarks,
because earmarks specify the project to be funded directing agencies how to
spend appropriations, therefore, earmarks are “Federal spending with a zip code”
(Porter and Walsh, 2006).
Without earmarks local governments with a higher amount of own source
revenue will have more options to replace lost earmark funding. However, those
municipalities with a smaller pool of own source revenues find it more difficult to
replace earmarked funds. The town of Pueblo, Colorado relied on earmarks to
fund projects, including $300,000 to fix an aging sewer system (Nixon, 2014).
Pueblo received $14 million in earmarked funds between 2005 and 2010, and
without earmarks the city struggles to find funding for projects they once looked
to their representative in Congress to supply (Nixon, 2014). The Pueblo City
Manager stated, “before the ban we would contact our Congressional
delegations and ask them for help. Now we have to try and navigate the vast
federal maze of agencies to see what funding is out there” (Nixon, 2014, p. 2).
The navigation has increased the cost of lobbying for federal grants from $40,000
to $60,000 out of an already tight city budget (Nixon, 2014).
Earmarks are a defensible practice despite their reputation for being a
quid-pro-quo negotiating tactic strictly for the purpose of pleasing constituents
and gaining re-election. Cuellar (2012) explains, “pork barrel spending when
considered in isolation are probably more transparent than many other political
deals” (p. 284). Further, even unreasonable earmarks are valuable in a
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legislation system often plagued with conflicting priorities (Cuellar, 2012).
Earmark supporters argue that earmarks are a necessary part of the legislation
process in order to “grease the wheels,” and gather support for “important
legislation” (Porter & Walsh, 2006). Earmarks allow members of Congress to
negotiate directed spending to their district, resulting in support for later
legislation and avoiding the gridlock that led to the government shutdown in 2012
(Hudak, 2013).

Disadvantages of Earmarks
Earmarks generate tension between the public desire for funding projects
and the resentment toward legislative deal-making. Earmarks in practice create
tension; they limit the flexibility of spending, because they do not always align
with local priorities and planning strategies, but at the same time free up other
funds that would have otherwise been used for earmarked projects (Kunz &
O’Leary, 2012). Critics believe local leaders are more equipped to understand
their community needs and priorities (Porter & Walsh, 2006). Further, when
funding is completely unrelated to local government plans it can go unobligated
for long periods of time (Porter & Walsh, 2006). Relatedly, Savage (2009) noted
earmarking costs, which include time, energy, and financial resources are not
included in the total dollar amount of the earmark. Thus, earmarking costs make
it difficult for local governments to execute the earmark, which results in
unobligated funding. The Consolidation Appropriations Act of 2016 was created
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to repurpose $2 billion in unobligated earmarks to support infrastructure projects
(fhwa.gov).
The unbalanced nature of earmark distribution sparks further criticism of
the process (Doyle, 2011). Political leverage, especially for members of the
majority party, is a main factor in the ability to secure earmarks for particular
districts (Doyle, 2011) Higher ranking members of Congress, such as those in
the leadership or members of influential committees, are also in a better position
to secure more funding, because they are in a better position to trade votes for
funds (Lazarus, 2009). This creates an imbalance, because state and local
governments in the most need lack the political capital to get their share (Kunz &
O’Leary, 2012). Jeffrey Lazarus (2010) argues, that state and local demand also
plays a big role in securing earmarked funds. Areas dense in military bases, or
farm land are more likely to secure earmark funding than an area that is in need
of road upgrades, because of the benefits such projects can produce (Lazarus,
2010). The unbalanced nature of earmark distributions also creates an uneven
tax burden to earmark dollar ratio, for example, New York, which receives around
two percent of earmarked dollars, is responsible for over eight percent of the
federal tax burden (DeHaven, 2010).
Earmarking can also have an effect on democracy in general. Members of
Congress face pressure from constituents to produce tangible results, which
require funding. Hollibaugh et al. (2013), explains, while voters “generally view
earmarks as unacceptable, they also tend to be more likely to vote for
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incumbents who have records of bringing government projects and money to
their districts” (p. 1). As a result, Members of Congress will cast a vote for
legislation they would normally not support, in exchange for an earmark, that
would fund a project in their district. Further, Lazarus (2009) found, that the
majority party in Congress has the most influence and means of securing
earmarks. As a result, the majority party can secure funding for electorally
vulnerable Member districts and increase their chances of getting reelected
(Lazarus, 2009). Thus, the majority party would increase their chances of
remaining the majority, and continue to control control legislative outcomes
(Lazarus, 2009).
Earmarks can create dependency as was discussed above in the case of
Pueblo, Colorado. State and local government leaders become reliant on
earmark funding, and as a result increase spending to amplify the effect of their
loss (Delany, 2014). Earmarks can also decrease production, for example, in
areas like higher education an increase in research grants funded with earmarks,
increases the quantity of research, but can decrease the quality of the research
(Delany, 2014). This phenomenon is the result of members of Congress making
funding decisions outside the scope of their expertise (Porter & Walsh, 2006).
Further, earmark funding often times will bypass competitive protocols that limit
poor research proposals (Delany. 2014).
Negative media attention on earmarks generally focuses on earmarks as
wasted money. News articles and editorials consistently portray earmarks as a
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flagrant abuse of legislative power (Crespin et al., 2009). For example, in the FY
2008 Omnibus bill, Rep. David Hobson (R-OH) secured an $800,000 earmark to
fund a “Speedway Super America gas station convenience store, and pizza
parlor” (Crespin et al., 2009, p. 3). Negative media attention on earmarks, such
as this are justifiable, but political rhetoric for the purpose of increased ratings
and website traffic does nothing but influence voters with information they would
not have otherwise cared about. Doyle (2011) noted, “According to an editor at
CQ Weekly, earmarks have been cited as a symbol of everything that’s wrong
with Congress” (p. 2). However, there is little awareness of earmark activity
amongst voters, and even less evidence to support a claim of swayed voting in
either direction (Doyle, 2011).
Lobbying scandals like that of former Congressman Cunningham have
created a distrust and given “watch-dog” groups TCS and CAGW cause to
discredit earmarks. As a result, earmark support resulting in campaign
contributions is a legitimate concern. Rocca, and Gordon (2012) explain, the
main target of earmarked funds is not necessarily the voter. The need for
members of Congress to attract campaign funding suggests the target would
likely be special interest groups (Rocca & Gordon, 2012). If defense contractors
were able to bribe Congressman Cunningham to clear the way for government
contracts, it is plausible earmarks have assisted in other Congressional favor
(Archibald, 2006). Roca and Gordon (2012) found, that members of Congress
secure more campaign financing per earmark dollar from defense special
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interests groups, which correlates with the point that James Savage (2009)
makes, that the majority of earmark dollars comes from the Department of
Defense (DOD) budget. For example, in 2008 Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA),
sponsored a $1.2 million earmark to benefit Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC), for the purpose of strategies to mitigate individual stress
reactivity and operational defense stress reactions in the military
(opensecrets.org), and to partially benefit local defense firms like SAIC and their
work with posttraumatic stress disorder (opensecrets.org). The return on
investment was $2.66 million in campaign contributions (opensecrets.org). The
chart below shows the general advantages and disadvantages of earmarks.

Table 1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Earmarks
Advantages
Optional Funding Source
Prevent Change in Political Climate
from Controlling Funds
Local Municipalities Know their
Needs Better and Small Towns have
few Options
Have Funded Breast Cancer
Research and the Boys and Girls
Club

Disadvantages
Do Not Align With Local Planning
Political Leverage Creates Allocation
Imbalance
Create Dependency, Leaving Local
Government without the Ability to
Find Alternative Solutions
Have Resulted in Lobbying Scandal,
and Lack Oversight
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CHAPTER THREE
FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE

Governmental budgeting in its simplest form is a series of compromises
derived from opposing priorities. Scarce resources create a struggle at all levels
of government to develop a spending plan that will balance the public demand for
better services, and a reluctance to pay increased taxes (Bell et al., 2005). Local
governments are often in the worst position, because their budgets are
dependent on projecting current revenues from sources such as taxes,
miscellaneous fees, and intergovernmental funds, without the luxury of deficit
spending as seen in the federal budget (Kunz & O’Leary, 2012). Further, the
state legislature, and in some instances voter discretion, can limit the specificity
of the fees and taxes local governments can use, including type and amount
(Lee, et al., 2008). For example, California’s Proposition 13, which limits property
tax increases (Finkler et al., 2013) and San Bernardino, California’s Measure Z,
which increased sales tax 0.25% to fund various public safety activities
(sbcity.org). The limits placed on revenue sources creates a fiscal environment
where politics will play a bigger role in budgeting decisions. Thus, leaving
infrastructure spending vulnerable to last priority status, because it is not at the
top of constituent wish lists.
Infrastructure has been defined in academic textbooks and in the text of
national associations reports. Infrastructure as defined in textbooks is stationary
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assets with long life spans including: bridges, tunnels, dams, water systems and
other similar structures (Finkler et al., 2013). The American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE) has the most comprehensive definition of infrastructure, and
have broken the nations system of infrastructure into several categories. The
ASCE issues an annual report depicting “the condition and performance of the
nation’s infrastructure,” provides this extensive definition for infrastructure:
Critical Infrastructure includes systems, facilities, and assets so
vital that their destruction or incapacitation would have debilitating
impact on national security, the economy or public health, safety,
and welfare. Critical infrastructure may cross political boundaries
and may be built (such as structural energy, water transportation,
and communication systems), natural (such as surface or ground
water resources), or virtual (such as cyber, electronic data, and
information systems) (asce.org).
The confines of this research do not require an extensive definition of the
term, nor does it require the extended number of categories. Thus, for this
research, infrastructure will be narrowed to include transportation, specifically,
bridges, roads, highways and highway overpasses. Funding options for
infrastructure projects are determined through the process of capital budgeting,
which is generally used for debt management and resource allocation to longterm projects with a larger price tag (Bland, 2007). State regulations in most
cases require a balanced operating budget, which forces the separation of the
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capital budget from the operating budget (Posner, 1993). At the state and local
level long-term planning is often represented in a capital improvement plan (CIP)
to separate long-term and current spending (Lee et al., 2008). The federal
government budget, however, is not issued with a separate capital budget,
instead long-term spending must compete with annual appropriations for funding
allocation (Kunz, 2008). Further, federal and local long-term assets differ in
context. The federal government considers education, human capital and
economic stimulation as capital assets, while local governments consider capital
assets to be owned assets such as, buildings and equipment (Lee et al., 2008),
generally understood to be tangible asset of a particular dollar amount (Posner,
1993).
Capital projects require a significant amount of funding, either in the form
of a one-time large lump sum, or some degree of financing and debt use system
to complete (Bland, 2007). Local and state governments with limited revenue
streams are often forced into creative decision making to plan and execute large
capital projects (Bland, 2007). Further, declining federal assistance to state and
local governments due to federal government budget issues, have put further
stress on state and local governments to finance capital projects on their own
(Bell et al., 2005).
The majority of local governments analyze capital investment in the
decision making process, and separate those expenses from current spending
plans (Bell et al., 2005). Opponents of the capital budgeting process argue that
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capital budgets produce project favoritism similar to the practice of earmarking,
and can allow for the execution of unnecessary projects, as a political move,
without showing an immediate cost on the books (Posner, 1993). Further, the
allocation of funding for capital projects can vary depending on the fiscal health
of the government (Lee et al, 2008). As a result, this presents a distorted view of
overall spending (Lee et al., 2008). Local governments can decrease CIP funding
year-to-year to make up for declining revenues without cutting general services
(Lee et al., 2008). This practice can lead to long-term infrastructure deficiencies
in a local government that struggles to come back from fiscal hardship. For
Example, San Bernardino, California transferred funds from gas tax, which is
earmarked for street maintenance and construction, to the general fund to cover
salary and benefit costs in public works and other departments (SBCAFER,
2012-13). This left an inadequate amount of gas tax funding to complete projects
presented in the 2012-13 CIP (San Bernardino Budget 2012-13). Despite
criticism capital investments are an imperative factor in how the city takes shape
and its viability for economic growth (Posner, 1993).

Infrastructure Funding Sources
Local governments have several options for long-term financing for capital
projects. Since long-term investments have a high cost and a slow rate of return
on investment, sluggish revenues make keeping up with such projects difficult
(Bland, 2007). The federal government uses up front spending to fund long-term
financing, however, if funds are needed elsewhere that funding is abruptly cut
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(Posner, 1993). Local governments typically use a mix of financing options
depending on the size of the project and the fiscal health of the organization.
Own Source Revenue
One form of infrastructure financing available to local governments is
known as pay-as-you-go. Local governments have typically used general
revenues to fund the pay-as-you-go system for financing infrastructure projects,
but decades of tax revenue decline have limited availability of funds beyond
general operating obligations (Bell et al., 2005). Taxes and fees make up the
majority of local government annual general revenue, of which property and
sales tax make up the bulk, with small amounts being contributed from stadium
and business license tax (TPC, 2016). Own source revenues also use a form of
earmarking to fund specific projects. Specifically, transportation infrastructure
construction and maintenance, which are partially funded through excise tax and
user fees including; vehicle licenses and registration fees, emission fees, and
gas tax (Bell et al., 2005). The use of these fees for construction and
maintenance of transportation related infrastructure appears to be an efficient
and logical use of the revenue, however, vehicle related fees are subject to
fluctuations in oil prices, the advancement of clean air technology, vehicle
longevity and changes in driver habits (Bell et al., 2005). Further, the majority of
these funds carry added costs, similar to those Savage (2009) found in
earmarks, resulting in having to either find other sources to fund project costs,
planning less projects, or scrapping projects already in the works.
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Intergovernmental Revenue
Local governments receive a fair amount of funding assistance from state
governments. Assistance comes in the form of shared tax revenue,
reimbursements for prison expenditures or payments in lieu of taxes (NLC,
2016). The National League of Cities estimates that states have provided
between twenty and twenty-five percent of local government revenue in the last
twenty-years (NLC, 2016). Infrastructure specific funding from state governments
to local governments is also done through State Infrastructure Banks, which
similar to a private bank supplies municipalities with transportation funding in the
form of loans (Bell et al., 2005). In California, the California Infrastructure and
Economic Development Bank provides loans in the amount of $50,000 to
$25,000,000 for up to 30 years, through the Infrastructure State Revolving Fund
(ibank, 2016).
Federal funding to local governments is significantly less than state
funding at around five percent. One reason is because the federal government
uses cost reduction techniques such as, tax incentives to increase local revenue
(NLC, 2016). Local governments typically receive funding in the form of grants
and loans from the federal government that are designated for specific types of
costs including infrastructure projects (NLC, 2016). The federal government
distributes grants through different agencies, such as the DOT and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Kunz, 2008). There are a variety of
grant and loan programs used to supplement infrastructure investments
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including; the Federal Aid Highway Program, Transit Capital Investment
Program, and Clean Water State Revolving Loan Fund Programs (Kunz, 2008).
Earmarking plays a significant role in federal grant allocation, because earmark
designated projects alter federal agency planning. Thus, funding once
designated for a particular state or local government could be stripped at the last
minute in favor of an earmarked project (Savage, 2009). Further, since earmarks
can be politically driven state and local governments with projects marked as
priority or that have gone through the merit process for requesting funds can be
denied in favor of a “less” worthy project (Brach & Wachs, 2005).
Bonds
The most predominantly used types of bonds to fund local infrastructure
include; municipal bonds, which are federal income tax exempt through federal
subsides, general obligation bonds, which are secured with the full faith and
credit of the issuing party and paid for with general revenues, and revenue
bonds, which are assigned a particular revenue stream for repayment purposes
(Kunz, 2008). The use of a variety of different bonds allows local governments to
use debt as up front revenue to fund infrastructure projects, and not take the
immediate hit to general operating fund (Bell et al., 2005) This allows local
governments to provide residents with needed projects without cutting back on
other critical services.
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Earmarks
Funding infrastructure with earmarks is an inconsistent option for local
governments. Earmarks depend on federal allocation, which can be muddled in
the political aspects of the budget process (Bell et al., 2005). Members of
Congress submit requests for earmarks to the Appropriation committee, which
sends the request to the relevant sub-committee (Poos, 2011). The approval or
denial of an earmark fully rests on the decision of the sub-committee chair,
“whose power and secrecy have lent them the nickname of the cardinals” (Porter
& Walsh, 2006, p. 8). Thus, earmark funding decisions are made unilaterally,
contrary to regular appropriations, which are subject to debate, scrutiny, and then
vote of Congress.
Regular appropriations are broad spending directives for government
programs such as, defense, education and transportation. Once Congress
approves an agency’s budgets with special spending categories, the agency will
then solicit project funding requests (fhwa.gov). Earmarks have a specific
statutory destination for use on a specific project (Porter & Walsh, 2006). Porter
and Walsh (2006) note, that some spending bills have detailed reports, such as
funding for a particular fighter jet, as a matter of accounting procedure. However,
earmarks “would add money to the department’s request at a level of specificity
below the normal line item level (Porter & Walsh, 2006, p. 5).
Earmarks are also different from regular appropriations because some are
written into the reports accompanying appropriations bills and final conference
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reports (Porter & Walsh, 2006). The purpose of these reports is not to become
law, but to explain congressional intent, thus earmark spending is left to the
discretion of the agency it is assigned (Porter & Walsh, 2006). However, it is not
often an agency will go against Congress instructions out of fear of retaliation in
the following year budget (Porter & Walsh, 2006).
Earmarks are the product of federal political agendas, but since they
represent a funding source with a specific purpose, earmarks avoid political
debate at the local level. However, earmark funds are only a partial funding
source for their designated project, therefore, the awardee must secure the
additional funds before the earmark can be obligated (fhwa.gov). Finally,
earmarks do not fund continued maintenance and upkeep of a project (Kunz,
2008). As a result, local governments must increase their maintenance and
repair budgets in order to account for the added structure. Thus, earmarks can
assist in funding local infrastructure needs, if the distribution makes sense with
local priorities.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

The purpose of this study is to explain the costs associated with
earmarking funds for infrastructure in local governments. The relationship
between additional costs and earmarks is not well documented in the academic
literature, therefore, this paper has become an exploration into the subject.

Data Collection and Analysis
As this is an exploratory study, the analysis began with an extensive
review of the literature. In order to understand the process of earmarking a wide
focus was placed around the relevant subject matter. The literature review
consisted of an extensive mix of academic peer reviewed journals, government
documents that included budget and finance reports, memorandums, institutional
review reports, and congressional appropriations bills. Media documents that
included news articles, and press releases was also analyzed. Also included in
was a review of documentation and data from national associations, such as
American Society of Civil Engineers; and special interest groups, such as Tax
Payers for Common Sense (TCS), Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW),
and Center for Responsive Politics (opensecrets.org).
The findings for this research will be presented in a case study of
individual earmarks selected from the thousands of line-items reviewed. As
stated in Chapter 1, this study uses raw data to analyze the effects of earmarks
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on the agency they were designated to fund. The enormous amount of data
related to this topic required directed focus for the purpose of presenting
research findings. Without a particular level of focus, the data could become a
muddled pool of meaningless numbers, but the goal is to present as clear a
picture of the true costs of earmark projects as possible.
In social research the case study is often used to focus attention on a
particular instance, as well as produce either descriptive or explanatory insights
(Babbie, 2011). The use of a case study allows a researcher to limit the attention
to a particular instance, and can assist in the development of general theory
(Babbie, 2011). However, critics believe case studies limit the results of the
research for several reasons. First, a case study contains bias toward, “the
researchers preconceived notions,” which allows the researcher to be more
subjective in their analysis (Starman, 2013, p. 40). However, a case study is
easily verified in the descriptive detail of the research process (Starman, 2013).
Second, it is hard to draw definitive conclusions and generalize results from a
single case. (Starman, 2013). As a result, case studies in social science are best
used for generating a hypothesis and “cannot contribute to scientific development
(Starman, 2013, p. 39). However, case studies are an analytical study, of
process or events, and not a statistical study, of frequency or correlation,
therefore, a single subject is preferred over multiple subjects (Starman, 2013).
Despite the disadvantages and limitations, a case study proved to be the proper
tool to accomplish the goal of this study.

32

Data and Data Analysis
Earmark data can be taken from several sources. Special interest
groups TCS and CAGW have been collecting and monitoring data for
several years. TCS provides data from FYs 2008-2010. TCS has
organized the data into categories including, House requesting member,
Senate requesting member, Appropriations committee requests, state
recipient, and appropriations bill. CAGW has been tracking earmarks
since the 1990s, and have published an annual “pig book” highlighting the
Members of Congress, that have requested earmarks, the amount of the
earmark, and in which appropriations bill the earmark is located. CAGW
does provide up to date information including earmarking that has been
found in 2016 (despite the earmark ban of 2011), but CAGW data is
limited in the ability to search for specifics.
Earmark data is also available through the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). The OMB website offers earmark data for FY 2005,
and FYs 2008-2010. OMB data proved to be the most useful, because it
allowed for the data to be drilled down to the exact project the earmark
was designated to fund.
Others sources of data include the DOT, which had data for
unobligated earmarked funds as of December of 2015, that are set for
redistribution. Data from the DOT was also found in department report AV2007-066, which was an analysis the Inspector General’s Office
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conducted to review earmarks within the DOT. California Department of
Transportation (CalTrans) and local government documents also
contained minimal data, mostly in the form of notations in the CIP or
memorandums.
The nature of this research could potentially take on a wide range of data
analysis and investigations. To stay within the scope and size of the exploratory
nature of this study, the decision to use a raw data supported case study was
made. For comparative purposes charts, graphs, and tables are used to illustrate
the relationship between the appropriated earmark funds and the total cost of the
designated project.
Earmark Selection. Earmark data for this study was gathered and
analyzed between February 2016 and the early part of April 2016. For the
purposes of this study, data were gathered from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). The OMB was selected as the primary source for selecting
earmarks, because it allowed the earmarks to be traceable from its origin in an
appropriations or authorization bill to the specific project it was allocated. Further,
OMB data was a predominant feature in the literature on earmarks, which speaks
to its reliability.
Research Limitations
Subject and Data Limitations. The numerous definitions that exist for the
subject of earmarking created a need for a condensed operational definition to fit
the structure of the research. Limiting the definition forced the focus on a
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particular form of earmarking within government. This limitation served the
purpose of this study, however, since local governments earmark funding
sources, for example Gas Tax revenue, limiting the definition does not analyze all
of the challenges involved in using earmarking as a method of funding within
local governments.
Local government budgets present a particular challenge to the research,
because it is difficult to isolate earmarks within budget documents. Although, a
few local governments indicate “federal earmark” as a funding source it is not a
consistent labeling technique. As a result, tracking earmarks from point A to point
B is challenging and could result in unintended error. Further, earmarks
contained in particular departments are only one source of federal earmarks. The
federal budget process is extensive and complex, because of this earmarks can
also be found in executive orders, and directives; authorizing and continuing
legislation; and general budget documents. The difficulty of isolating the final
destination combined with the vast amount of earmarks in the archives of federal
data increases the likelihood of data collection and analysis error. Further,
Individual error may also impact the research. There are tens of thousands of
earmarks located in the abundance of documents reviewed throughout the
course of the research process. It would be difficult to ascertain whether every
possible earmark was accounted for, or whether a potential red flag was
overlooked.
The earmark ban instituted in 2011 proposes unique challenges to this or
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any future research on the subject of earmarking. First, the literature concerning
earmarks is exceptionally limited after 2011. Further, most studies conducted
prior to 2011 focused on distribution and negative aspects of earmarks. Very few
focused on the added costs associated with earmarks or the earmarking process.
Second, the data is dated. Although, CAGW has noted earmarks in the 2016
budget, the bulk of the data is over half a decade old, which may account for the
difficulty in isolating funding destinations.
Researchers Bias. Researchers can frame the concepts and
measurements of their research to match personal beliefs, thus eliminating other
possible outcomes (Babbie, 2011). The tone of the literature reviewed in this
study, in combination with prior knowledge on the subject, had the ability to sway
the analysis of data toward a specific preconceived conclusion. However, the
research process has been detailed in an attempt to combat the possibility of
conclusions being drawn from personal bias.
Convenience Sampling. In this research when selecting earmarks for
analysis the convenience of familiarity played a role in the decision. A mental
visual of the earmark funded project made it easier to understand the process.
For example, an earmark for an overpass on the I-10 freeway in California’s
Coachella Valley, where a researcher has frequented, will be easier to analyze,
than an earmark for the rehabilitation of Kenel Road in South Dakota, where a
researcher has never visited. Although, convenience sampling admittedly limits
the results of the research, for this particular project the selected earmarks will be
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sufficient. However, this particular limitation would need to be overcome in order
to pursue future work on the subject.
Despite these limitations, this study effectively addresses the issues
surrounding earmarks and answers the research question, to what extent does
earmarking funds for infrastructure projects inflate the overall cost of the project?
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY: COACHELLA VALLEY

The following case study is the analysis of an earmark designated to the
Coachella Valley for a series of highway interchange upgrades. The upgrades
are part of a congestion reduction project for the vastly growing desert area.

Selected Earmarks
In FY 2005, Congress issued 6,337 earmarks through the DOT. The
majority of the allocated earmarks were issued through the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA). The SAFETEA was
signed into law in August of 2005, with the purpose of supplying $286 billion in
federal money to improve road transportation throughout the United States
(fhwa.gov). The SAFETEA, like most authorization and appropriation bills in the
early part of the 2000s, contained thousands of earmarks, including Alaska’s
infamous “Bridge to Nowhere.” Despite the general focus on the Alaskan bridge,
the majority of the earmarks in the SAFETEA were designated for high priority
projects.
The state of California received 544 of the 6,337 FY 2005 DOT earmarks.
Two of those earmarks were allocated to high priority projects in the Coachella
Valley; $2.2 million for CONSTRUCTION costs related to the upgrade of the
Interstate-10 (I-10) / Indian Avenue (now Indian Canyon) Interchange, and $2.2
million for CONSTRUCTION costs related to the upgrade of the I-10 / Bob
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Hope/Ramon Road Interchange. Table two illustrates the distribution of DOT
earmarks in FY 2005.

Table 2. Department of Transportation Earmarks Fiscal Year 2005
Authorization
# of 2005 Earmarks
Amount ($k)
SAFETEA
6306
$23,082,999
ESEA
15
$52,781
TEA 21
8
$7,681
FSRIA
5
$208,324
IDEA
1
$1,469
Office of Management and Budget. (2014). Earmarks in authorization bills
[Data File]. Retrieved from https://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/byauthorization/summary.html

Earmarked Project Background
The Coachella Valley is located at the west end of Southern California’s
Sonoran Desert. It is known for its warm climate, annual music festivals, and lush
golf courses. The I-10 divides the Coachella Valley in half with residents and
businesses on either side. This particular thirty-mile stretch of the I-10, referred to
as the Coachella Valley corridor, connects the Coachella Valley to Riverside, Los
Angeles and San Bernardino to the west, and Phoenix to the East (dot.ca.gov).
High volumes of population growth during the 1990s and early 2000s have
created traffic congestion issues on interchanges and arterial roads throughout
the corridor. Congestion is the result of the various purposes the corridor serves
to the Coachella Valley including; residents use the corridor as a commuter
highway to move from city-to-city for work and recreation in the Coachella Valley
area, overpasses and arterial roads connect cities in the area, such as Indian
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Canyon and Palm Drive, which connects Palm Springs to Desert Hot Springs,
and it remains a travel bypass for interregional travelers heading into Los
Angeles, Riverside and San Bernardino from the east and out-of-region travelers
into Phoenix from the west (dot.ca.gov). Figure one shows the projected growth
of the Coachella Valley through 2030.
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Figure 1. Coachella Valley Projected Growth.

The projected growth of the Coachella Valley prompted the forming of a
coalition of government agencies to begin surveying, and conducting
environmental and cost analysis studies for a series I-10 corridor upgrade
projects. This coalition included; the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), Coachella Valley Associated
Governments (CVAG), Riverside County, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians and the cities of Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Cathedral City,
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Rancho Mirage, Palm Desert, Indio, Coachella, Indian Wells, and La Quinta. It
was determined that over the next decade commercial and residential
development plans throughout the Coachella Valley would increase interregional
and commuter traffic along the corridor (dot.ca.gov). The risk of congestions and
delays were inevitable, thus the coalition identified seven upgrade projects along
the corridor to alleviate traffic congestion issues.
Earmark: Indian Canyon/Interstate-10 Interchange
The DOT FY 2005 SAFETEA authorization bill included an earmark for
$2.2 million dollars allocated for use toward construction costs related to the
upgrade of the Indian Canyon Road / I-10 Interchange (ICR-I10). Authorization
bill funding is allocated with specific description of use, which limits the realm of
eligible costs (dot.ca.gov). Thus, leaving the recipient of the earmark to fit the bill
for other costs related to the project. Further, earmarks can typically require a
local match of 20%, and earmarks allocated through authorization bills will lapse
at the end of the life of the bill (Chiu, 2010). The ICR-I10 earmark was
designated for construction support costs having to do with the administration
and inspection of the ICR-I10 construction (City Council Staff Report, 2010). As a
result, pre-construction activities such as, environmental survey, design
engineering, and right of way costs are not an eligible cost the earmark would
cover. In addition, the SAFETEA bill had a lapse date of September 30, 2009
(omb.gov).
Project Obstacles and Costs. The coalition of government agencies
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gathered to begin work on the I-10 corridor projects designated Palm Springs,
California as the lead agency on the ICR-I10 project. This decision was
determined based on the proximity to the project and the share of benefit Palm
Springs would receive from the upgrades (City Council Report, 2008).
After the completion of the environmental phase of the ICR-I10 project in
2006, the City of Palm Springs (City) faced several challenges and delays
resulting from right-of-way acquisition and utility coordination. The right-of-way
phase of the project includes acquisition of right-of-way, as well as the
coordination of relocation of utilities in the area of the project (City Council Staff
Report, 2009). Caltrans requires a cost share for utility relocation of 50/50
between the Utility and the requesting agency. Since the City is performing the
right-of-way work on behalf of Caltrans, the City is required to perform said work
in accordance with Caltrans master contracts (City Council Staff Report, 2009).
In 2008, the City contracted with Dokken Engineering for the design, and preconstruction support activities related to the ICR-I10 project. Costs related to
right-of-way and pre-construction support services were not eligible for use of
earmarked funds, therefore, the City was forced to seek other avenues to pay for
these services. As a result, the city entered into agreement with CVAG for use of
Measure A funds on a reimbursement bases to cover the costs of, utility
relocation (City share) and Dokken Engineering construction support services
(City Council Staff Report, April, 2010). Table three highlights the costs related to
construction support activities.
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Table 3. Costs Related to Right-of-Way and Construction Support
Activity
Planning and
Development
Structures and
Roadway
Construction Support
Construction Bidding
Plans
Utility Relocation

Cost
$636,221

Actor
Dokken

$760,353

Dokken

$186,274
$10,008

Dokken
Dokken

$125,036

So. Cal. Edison

Another big obstacle in the use of authorization bill earmarks for local
governments is the continual adjustments made to the obligated (OB) amount.
According to the FHWA:
In a multi-year reauthorization act, (such as SAFETEA), the
earmarks are spread out over the life of the act, i.e., a portion of the
earmark is provided in each year. Each annual portion is subjected
to that year’s annual obligation limit (fhwa.gov).
Table four provides a breakdown of the obligation rate of an earmark.

Table 4. Fiscal Impact on a $2.2 million Earmark ($ in thousands)
Year
Allocate
OB %

Year 1
$440
91%

Year 2
$440
89%

Year 3
$440
91%

Year 4
$440
91%

Year 5
$440
85%

Totals
$2,200

Adjusted

$400

$391

$400

$400

$374

$1,966

Federal Highway Administration. (2005). Earmark Obligation Impact.
Retrieved from
https://www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/Planning/LocalPrograms/Document
s/Congressional%20FHWA%20Earmark%20and%20Discretionary%20G
uidance.pdf

43

The end result is a decrease in the original earmark amount, and
an increase to the agency financial burden to complete the designated
project.
In September 2009, after several years of delays resulting from
right-of-way acquisition, the City entered into a Construction Cooperative
Agreement with Caltrans and Riverside County to administer the
construction of the ICR-I10 upgrade project. The total estimated cost at
the time of construction was set at $25,475,600. The City was able to
accumulate the total amount of needed funding through several sources
including; the receipt of $5,517,500 in funds from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), $13,656,00 from the State Cash Regional
Improvement Program (RIP) and the original earmark funding (City
Council Staff Report, July, 2010).
According to City documents, a second earmark in the amount of
$1,120,885, (which would have an original value of $1.5 million prior to
obligation deduction), was used in conjunction with the original $2.2 million
SAFETEA earmark to fund the project (City Council Staff Report, July,
2010). However, this particular earmark could not be traced back to the
source, therefore, was not mentioned previously in this analysis.
City documents indicate the original construction estimate of
$25,475,600, would require a local match of $8,128,500, which would
have to be taken from own source revenues (City Council Staff Report,
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July, 2010). However, in July 2010, City Council approved a reduced
construction estimate of $16,526,137, as a result of the revised estimate
STIP/RIP funds would be adequate to fund the local match requirements,
resulting in “$0 local funding” (City Council Staff Report, July, 2010).
Case Study Findings
The preceding case study analyzed the effect of an earmark on the
designated project and the project’s lead agency. From the analysis of
available data, it was determined that the earmark was not a factor in the
delayed timing of the project, and was not the direct cause, but a
supplemental cause of the added costs to the project. The study reveals
that earmarks, similar to other federal funding sources, are partial
payment for top priority infrastructure projects. Further, earmark
distribution has obligation reduction regulations and expiration dates that
further limit their flexibility. It is also important to note that, added costs as
a result of administering earmarks, grants, or other federal funding
sources is incorporated into the costs of the daily operations of the
agency. In order to determine the exact cost of administering the project,
staff time would have to be coded directly to the designated project. It is
possible that some municipalities code staff time to particular projects to
satisfy accounting and audit regulations. However, such information is not
available without contacting the agency directly and may not be available
to the general public. The raw data used in this study, unfortunately, did

45

not reveal this sort of data. The ICR-I10 project required several sources
of funding in order to make up the difference between the original earmark
and final cost of the project. The designation of the earmark for
construction administration and inspection limited the scope of its use
resulting in costs above and beyond the its worth. The only direct cost that
the available data revealed, as a result of the earmark, was the local
match of $8 million dollars that was eliminated when a lower construction
bid was submitted.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Financial management is one of the more technical and grueling subdisciplines of public administration. Near the top of the list of important topics
within that sub-discipline is funding public service needs. The current economic
climate in numerous municipalities throughout the United States calls for a study
dealing with any type of funding to be given an extensive amounts of attention.
This study has just begun to scrape the surface of the examination of earmarks,
however, it has presented a few points of consideration. The first point is
illustrated in the Coachella Valley case study, which revealed that earmarks are
only a supplemental not a direct cause of the inflation of the overall project costs,
and do little to diminish the overall outcome. It was determined that the allocation
of earmarks brings about specific obstacles to using earmarks as a funding
source. For instance, specific use instructions allocate earmarks for a specific
portion of the project. In the case of the ICR-I10 earmark, it was designated for
use in construction administration and inspection, and not for use in construction
support. Thus, Palm Springs had to seek other sources of pre-construction phase
funding. In comparison, the $2.2 million earmark for the I-10 / Bob Hope
Drive/Ramon Road Interchange (RR-I10), which was designated for construction
administration and inspection, was supplemented with an earmark in FY 2009 in
the amount of $475,000, and another in FY 2010 in the amount of $500,000
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(omb.gov). Both earmarks were designated specifically for research in the preconstruction phase. Unlike the ICR-I10 project, the RR-I10 project received preconstruction and construction phase earmarks, a further example of their
limitations and complexities. Earmarks of this nature will require the local
government to find alternative sources of funding to support expenses
accumulated in project activities, related to, but not designated for, funding from
the earmark. As a result, this can lead to internal conflicts, which delay projects,
or cause them never to come to fruition (Chiu, 2010). The DOT is currently
working with other agencies to ‘Repurpose’ nearly $2 billion in unused earmarks,
resulting from project delays and cancelations (Chiu, 2010). In addition, earmarks
are straddled with obligation regulations, which devalue the earmark over the
course of the authorization bill term. In the Coachella Valley case study, the
original $2.2 million earmark was reduced to $1.9 million as a result of earmark
obligations. Local governments receiving federal earmarks must account for this
reduction in the planning process. The actual added cost of obligation regulations
is unknown without specific payroll data relating to the designated project. This
information was not available from the raw data used in this study.
The second point of consideration is earmark funding, despite the
negative rhetoric, are not more or less effective as a funding source than
traditional funding tools. In all cases of federal-aid for local governments there
will be a local match portion, usually near twenty-percent. As a result, larger
capital projects, such as infrastructure, will require multiple sources of federal,
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state, and local own source revenues. In the Coachella Valley case study, Palm
Springs was the benefactor of a last minute low bid, which reduced the overall
costs and allowed the City to avoid using own source revenues for local match. A
unique situation that does not always end with the same results for all local
governments.
The Coachella Valley case study and the literature revealed the same
theory; earmarks as a funding source from a functionality standpoint are similar
to regular appropriations, however, earmarks have a different form of inception
and are given different spending authority. Earmarks have a specific statutory
destination, while regular appropriations have a broad purpose. Thus, a regular
appropriation can be spent on a project that fits within the umbrella of its
purpose. For example, an appropriation made to the DOT for “highways” could
be spent on repairs, expansion, construction, or even research. However, an
earmark will be given specific instructions for spending, such as $500,000 for
construction research on the RR-I10. Earmarks also avoid the functions of
Congressional oversight and in some instance are not written into law. Instead
earmarks are written as instructions in committee reports that agencies are
expected abide.
Although, earmarks protect allocated funding from a change in the federal
political landscape, the way earmarks are added to authorizations and
appropriations bills allows Members of Congress to bargain and gain political
favor in their district. Earmarks speed up the federal-aid process in the sense
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there are fewer project approval hurdles to clear, however, create more hurdles
and less funding for municipalities with representatives that lack in political clout.
The SAFETEA authorization bill was loaded with earmarks that did not go
through the competitive process, some were for legitimate projects related to real
needs, and others were “nonsense” that sparked controversy.

Future Research
The limitations of this study raised more questions for future research to
explore. The topic would benefit from a deeper look into the administrative costs
related to infrastructure projects. Such a task would require more than the use of
raw data. Although, raw data is a good foundation to begin the study, a
researcher would need to conduct interviews of those involved with the project,
and gain access to specific documents that would contain line items for each cost
of the project.
With the injection of earmarks into the 2016 federal budget, further
research surrounding earmarks should focus on smaller projects, such as
research grants as a comparison to larger capital projects. Such a study could be
used to determine if earmarking has a greater cost depending on the nature of
the project.
Finally, the principle idea of this research can be applied to all sources of
funding in public administration not just earmarking. Extensive studies of
infrastructure projects from beginning to end would benefit the discipline in the
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sense it could lead to a solution to alleviating added costs, the imbalance of
funding distribution, and the evaluation of funded programs.
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